In his newest speak with Ray McGovern on Dialogue Works, John Helmer offers far and away the most effective overview1 up to now within the wake of Ukraine assaults on bridges and civilian trains, drone assaults concentrating on bombers in Russia’s nuclear deterrence forces, a failed new assault on Kerch Bridge, and telephone discussions between Lavrov and Rubio and later Trump and Putin.
As you will notice, Helmer focuses on whether or not Russia is about to go to what he calls “the Oreshnik second,” as in a devastating non-nuclear retaliation. Putin has chosen to place the query in abeyance by depicting the assaults as terrorism, versus acts of warfare, in order to not set off an obligation to interact in a strategic response below Russia’s nuclear doctrine. Putin argued that escalating and breaking off negotiations would quantity to going within the course that Kiev and its backers need Russia to take, and by implication this can be a lure to be averted.2
However the challenge nonetheless stays. As Helmer said in his accompanying written submit:
Now that Putin agrees that within the current warfare Russia is surrounded by enemies on all sides, and he should make the selection between the “path of wrestle” – since Sunday, June 1, that is now warfare on the level of nuclear arms — and the “path of conciliation” – that’s President Donald Trump’s peace phrases – what is going to Putin determine to do? c
As Helmer explains:
That is vital as a result of below the Russian nuclear doctrine of final December part 19c…an assault by a a non-nuclear state on Russia’s nuclear triad. Its functionality to discourage nuclear assault on Russia is taken into account a violation of the nuclear deterrence regime and requires below Russian coverage a big strategic degree of assault.
Beneath III. Circumstances for the Transition of the Russian Federation to the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, the textual content of 19c:
19. The situations that allow the potential of nuclear weapons employment by the Russian Federation are as follows:…
c) actions by an adversary affecting parts of critically vital state or navy infrastructure of the Russian Federation, the disablement of which might disrupt response actions by nuclear forces
Please be aware that Ray McGovern’s view on this speak, that the Ukraine assault didn’t cross nuclear doctrine purple traces, is an excessive outlier among the many common YouTube commentators on this warfare. However since he often tries to object to Helmer’s well-substantiated view, that Ukraine’s assault not simply legitimated however even per Russian doctrine, demanded a strategic retaliation, let’s put paid to this matter. We’ll flip the mike over to the fabulously seasoned and cool-headed former ambassador Chas Freeman, from a current speak on Neutrality Research, for the widely-shared evaluation:
Historically the weather of a nuclear deterrent pressure on each the American and the Soviet aspect, the Russian aspect if you’ll, have been exempt from assault for the quite simple motive that each international locations regard a an assault with typical weapons on their nuclear deterrent capability as equal to a nuclear assault and justifying a nuclear response. Either side take this very severely. In fact, Ukraine shouldn’t be a part of the SALT agreements, neither is the UK. So, they’re free, I suppose, mischievously to problem this exemption, they usually’ve performed so, and it’s very harmful.
On this interview, Nima hoisted remarks by US envoy Keith Kellogg that confirmed this interpretation. 3 Helmer flags US effort by US officers to keep away from discussing this and the Bryansk bridge assaults, and worse from a Russian perspective, the ensuing failure to sentence them.
To return to Helmer’s theme, of how Russia will reply, he argues:
(at 10:00) Because of this Russia is not going to use the Oreshnik second to assault at a strategic degree. As a substitute, it’s saying we’ll subordinate our retaliatory capability, subordinate it to the negotiations. And I’ve simply throughout the day spoken with my sources in Moscow and what they are saying is similar. I ask expressly on the problem of “Will there be an Oreshnik retaliation?” My supply able to know mentioned the launch of the Oreshnik is unlikely [Looks at notes] I’m studying it. Maybe later “Provided that there may be certainty that Trump is not going to ship. Perhaps now a measured strike to assist Trump focus.”
Should you learn Helmer’s article, he presents the textual content of the related part of Russia’s nuclear doctrine and lengthy type substantiates the factors:
Additionally omitted from Russian regulation is the excellence between acts of terrorism and acts of warfare… In no different state, both allied with Russia within the current warfare comparable to China, Iran and North Korea, or allied with the US and NATO towards Russia, is there a regulation differentiating between state acts of warfare and state acts of terrorism.
So the usually legalistic Putin is taking some massive definitional liberties in order to have a fig leaf for not partaking in a strategic retaliation. What’s bothersome is that advocates have a tendency to begin believing what they argue on behalf of their causes. Legal professionals defending shoppers they know are responsible often come to imagine their innocence. Is Putin equally going to return to imagine his minimization of those assaults?
However the fast query is why Russia is holding again from establishing that it has escalation dominance with out resorting to nuclear weapons. One issue could also be, as Larry Wilkerson mentioned in a current interview we highlighted, that the course of journey is that the US will hit the boundaries of its escalation ladder (with many not even totally greedy that Russia each outperforms the West in most weapons classes and might significantly outproduce the West too) it is going to go for a nuclear assault, and Russia is keenly conscious of that.
Nonetheless, Helmer factors out in his associated article (and he didn’t have an opportunity to cowl this within the interview) that the Kremlin is solely giving Trump the chance to ship on the newest Russian memorandum offered in Istanbul (see the phrases right here):
The supply explains Putin’s decision-making. “The political functionaries [Kremlin, Foreign Ministry] have their deal with the Memorandum and count on it is going to be signed. Now we look ahead to Trump to ship. Rubio despatched [Senator Lindsey] Graham to [Vladimir] Zelensky to just accept it. He talks greatest with Zelensky. Our aspect has some extra persistence earlier than replying to the ‘terror assaults’ [sarcastic laughter]. It is because all the reassurance we now have from the Individuals is that the end result of discussions can be constructive. A Russian navy response of huge proportions can wait. We now have persistence. It should occur if [emphasis] Trump is not going to ship Ukraine on Memorandum-1.” How lengthy will the Kremlin give Trump? the supply was requested. “A number of weeks, not months.”
This forbearance is unpopular inside Russia, as Helmer4 and even readers have indicated, even with the trouble to underplay its seriousness.
In our submit on Larry Wilkerson’s response to the drone strikes, we ventured that Russia wouldn’t retaliate for a number of weeks in order to let the negotiations play out. Russia has made a degree of observing kinds. Why rush when time is in its favor? A delay of weeks not solely permits them to chew up extra of Ukraine, but when they go for huge strikes, to higher pre-position troops and materiel to reap the benefits of it.
Helmer describes what the private and non-private official Russian positions are. I’ll flip to a evident contraction, of Helmer’s insistence on this and earlier talks, that Russia is testing the US, with the truth that he additionally factors out that Russian officers, as they’ve repeatedly said, at size, with vigor, and with receipts, that the US it completely, prime to backside untrustworthy. So why trouble testing when the reply?
Helmer is way too good to not acknowledge this conundrum, however maybe he has causes for not questioning what he had been advised. I’ll contemplating this matter after extra dialogue of the state of play, notably the Trump name to Putin.
The responsible silence from the US aspect is telling. The State Division offered an uninformative readout save registering that Lavrov initiated the decision. The Russian readout reveals that Rubio gave his condolences for the victims of the Bryansk bridge assault. However the Lavrov name got here inside hours of the Ukraine drone assault, and the truth that Rubio took in within the wee AM is an indicator that the US knew this scheme had gone pear-shaped and it was confronted with answering to Russia one way or the other.
One is tough pressed to make any sense of what Trump says. In any case, he and Putin had name either side thought to be pleasant and productive on Might 19,. Lower than two weeks later, Trump is asking Putin loopy, made a risk, and pretended to not know concerning the Putin assassination try. That was adopted by a barrage of intended-to-be-extremely critical assaults by the US proxy that fell quick.
No matter Lavrov mentioned to Rubio doubtless induced Trump to name:
As Larry Wilkerson factors out, Trump is appearing chastened, and I put extra emphasis on “appearing” that Johnson does. From his submit:
Here’s what I feel actually occurred… Lavrov, on the course of Vladimir Putin, referred to as Rubio to ship a stern message and a warning to President Trump….the Russian authorities was ready to take robust motion as a result of the assault on the airfields represented a direct risk to Russia’s nuclear capabilities… Russia goes to punish Ukraine and any international locations that offered help, whether or not materiel or intelligence, to this act of warfare.
The subsequent day, June 2nd, Russia’s lead negotiator, Vladimir Medinsky, met with Ukraine’s Protection Minister, Rustem Enverovych Umerov, prematurely of the formal assembly between the delegations of the 2 international locations. Medinsky delivered an ultimatum to Umerov, i.e., that is your final probability to just accept this deal or face worse penalties.
Trump was uncharacteristically silent on social media on Monday and Tuesday. I imagine that he was alarmed by Lavrov’s message…
We acquired our first clue on Tuesday, when Secretary of Protection Pete Hegseth introduced he wouldn’t attend the June 4 assembly of the Ukraine Protection Contact Group (UDCG). Secretary Hegseth’s absence from the June 4, 2025, assembly in Brussels marked the primary time a US protection chief didn’t take part in a UDCG session. Hegseth didn’t attend the earlier gathering in individual, however he did make a Zoom look
This will additionally clarify the odd look of a lead Bloomberg story on June 4, Unique: US Mentioned to Deny Air Cowl to Europe Drive in Postwar Ukraine, Its opening paragraphs:
The US is refusing to offer air defenses to again the “reassurance pressure” the UK and France are planning in a postwar Ukraine, individuals aware of the matter mentioned.
British Prime Minister Keir Starmer has insisted a US so-called backstop is important to discourage Russia from breaching any future ceasefire deal. However European allies have concluded throughout discussions with their American counterparts that President Donald Trump received’t present the ensures they’ve sought to again the Europe-led ‘coalition of the prepared,’ in accordance with the individuals, who requested anonymity disclosing non-public discussions.
Thoughts you, the US has already mentioned no to this kind of entreaty. So why has this come up once more? It seems that these EU leaders went once more to the US, hoping that the drone assaults had been sufficient of an indication of Russian weak point in order to steer Trump to alter his thoughts.
However how lengthy does this new-found probity final? One guesses at greatest till German Chancellor Freirich Merz visits him subsequent week.
So why is Russia going by way of this elaborate charade of treating the US as if it may ship on Russia’s calls for? As Chas Freeman mentioned,
What got here out of this assembly in Istanbul is an alternate of memoranda outlining the positions of the 2 sides. That makes it obvious that there’s completely no risk of a gathering of the minds.
I can’t start to make sense of Trump’s remarks on Iran. Admittedly, I’m overly reliant on Professor Mirandi, however he was a part of the workforce that negotiated the JCPOA. Mirandi has mentioned that Iran wouldn’t need Russia to intermediate in talks with the US, and that Russia wouldn’t need to be in that place both.
And as with the Ukraine-Russia talks, the 2 sides are at an deadlock. The Supreme Chief has rejected the US demand for no nuclear enrichment. No quantity of Putin sweet-talking, even when he have been to stoop to do this, would change issues. And why precisely ought to he do the US a stable now?
Furthermore, as Helmer identified, Russia is effectively conscious of the truth that there are deep divisions within the Administration. Extra particularly, Trump put neocons in key positions and regardless of having purges underway, they’re nonetheless very influential. Take a look at how when Keith Kellogg was supposed demoted to baby-sitting Zelensky, he’s managed to change into the important thing US advisor. Recall Steve Witkoff was displaced after Putin refused to see him. That in flip was as a result of Witkoff had change into the bearer of the 22 level memorandum devised by Kellogg and pals, and couldn’t be seen as an emissary for Trump.
As well as, Lindsay Graham is globetrotting like a wannabe Godzilla on a world tour, threatening his bone-crushing sanctions. One has to notice that is truly progress of kinds. Somebody will need to have given the memo to Graham that the US can’t meaningfully arm Ukraine, so at the least he’s not trumping for giant weapons packages.
Nonetheless, Graham claims he has 80 votes within the Senate. That’s sufficient to take away Trump from workplace if articles of impeachment have been to get to the Senate. That threat could appear distant now, however quite a lot of issues are going pear-shaped for Trump.
So allow us to return to the contradiction of Putin wanting to check Trump when Russia is aware of full effectively that the US and much more so Trump, can’t be trusted. So what’s the level of any take a look at?
The take a look at is probably not of reliability, however testing for power, as in intensifying pressures in order to see when and the place fractures happen. As an example, Trump does not like being pushed round by neocons regardless that he nonetheless lets himself be influenced by them. Taking part in the negotiation sport flatters Trump and may assist him, even when solely on the margin, in attempting to scale back the neocon’s energy.
Trump already loathes European leaders for having themselves or their predecessors deal with him shabbily throughout Trump 1.0 whereas being ungrateful for US protection safety. But Trump has been threatening to go away them to their very own gadgets, navy and particularly Ukraine-wise, whereas being very gradual to take steps to operationalize that, as armed providers sorts may say. The European leaders are notably upset that the negotiations are taking place in any respect. So preserving them going, even when on life help, additionally will increase stress on the US-Europe fault line.
One more reason for Russia to proceed with attrition, albeit intensified, for a number of weeks or perhaps a bit extra, is the very Iran challenge that Trump talked about. Netanyahu is simply as determined to get the US concerned on his aspect as Zelensky in Ukraine, with much better capability to make that occur. Earlier this 12 months, when Israel was engaged on a joint US-Israel strike bundle that Trump nixed, there have been experiences that Israel noticed its window for motion as late spring-early summer time. That was linked to the expiration of the snapback provisions within the JCPOA (any process must begin earlier than the tip of June in order to be accomplished earlier than the expiration date in October). That presumably means a deal must be “performed” by then or the US loses its leverage. And Netanyahu’s ever-weakening home place additionally creates a way of urgency.
In different phrases, Putin’s lame terrorism positioning could have been his cleanest excuse to attend to see if Israel does assault Iran, since that clock could be very a lot ticking. In that case, the US must Do One thing and NATO can be roped in to help (recall that the UK and France participated within the $2.3 billion protection towards Iran’s negotiated and scheduled assault on Israel that price Iran solely $90 million). So Russia would have a a lot freer hand within the scale and scope of its drone assault retaliation, and much more vital, the way it moved floor forces to capitalize on that.
Allow us to put this one other manner: Ukraine is about completed. There are gaps in its manning within the line of contact. Russia crossed the Oskil River unopposed. There are experiences of panic amongst Ukraine soliders as a result of advances in Sumy. This collection of assaults are recklessly determined, wild punches by Ukraine. The one final enhance it’d get is utilizing Taurus missiles, which do have an extended vary, of 500km, than earlier Western missiles.
However Germany can present solely 150. They need to be air launched, presumably from F-16, which have been notably lacking in motion, apparently as a result of ease of Russian interception. Sure, a number of may get by way of. However this can be a self-limited risk. And Russia doesn’t need to actual its revenge rapidly, on condition that Germany is a paper tiger.
Helmer mentioned Russia sees the US as taking part in a double sport, as if its chaos and incompetence even rises to the extent of a sport. Suppose Russia isn’t taking part in one too? Even with Helmer having wonderful sources, key reality and plans are doubtless very intently held.
My greatest guess is Russia acknowledges it wants to interrupt NATO and isn’t but prepared to confess to that as its actual goal. And in any occasion, it has to interrupt Ukraine. So first issues first. The method of subjugating Ukraine will weaken NATO and can enhance all kinds of splits (think about the recriminations and blame shifting). Russia will get all kinds of data from that course of as to how one can proceed subsequent.
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1Helmer refers particularly to particulars of paperwork and speeches, and likewise not like just about all Western YouTube commentators, has entry to high-level sources in Russia, together with on the Normal Employees.
2 The truth that Kiev may assume this can be a lure in its sport of data warfare doesn’t imply that an evaluation of dangers and advantages means Russia ought to chorus from retaliation for that motive. I can see the purpose in Scott Ritter phrases, that Russia doesn’t need Ukraine driving its OODA loop. However that doesn’t argue for no retaliation, simply no fast retaliation. Russia ought to decide advantageous instances and means.
3 See at 28:30:
Kellogg: What occurred this weekend..individuals have to know within the nationwide safety area while you assault uh an opponent’s a part of their nationwide survival system which is their triad the nuclear triad meaning your threat degree goes up since you don’t know what the opposite aspect’s going to do. You’re unsure. And that’s what they really did. And the one that basically involved me was the truth that there could have been experiences uh that they attacked the naval the northern fleet headquarters in Severomorsk . And if that’s the case, if while you assault two legs of a triad that to start with, it was a really daring assault. Um and while you do this, it’s very clear the danger ranges will go up. And I feel that’s what we’re attempting to keep away from. We’re attempting to get to a place the place the danger ranges have blown so excessive that this factor will develop and truly the place we don’t need to be.
Helmer identified the assault on the fleet didn’t occur.
4 Helmer’s examples:
Moskovsky Komsomolets, a mass circulation newspaper and tribune of in style opinion, has referred to as for a similar “willpower and harshness” towards Ukraine as Israel has proven towards Hamas. Boris Rozhin, talking for the Russian navy opinion and editor-in-chief of the broadly learn navy weblog, Colonel Cassad, mentioned: “I hope that the military-political management will discover a strategy to adequately reply. The blow must be painful… So long as we’re waging a restricted warfare, the enemy is waging a complete warfare, the aim of which is the destruction of our nation and folks. And no peace talks will change this. The longer it’s in coming, the extra disagreeable surprises.”
